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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The Range of Process in Ohio
An Ohio plaintiff who seeks personal judgments against several de-
fendants properly joinable in one action is allowed to determine all liabilities
in one action by that policy of the law which seeks to prevent a multiplicity
of suits.' In an in personam action the law of Ohio also favors the de-
fendant's right to be sued at a place which is convenient to him.' This note
is primarily concerned with situations wherein it is impossible for the courts
to encourage both policies. Such a situation arises when properly joined
defendants in an in personam action would, if sued individually, be properly
sued in separate counties. When a defendant counterdaims under the Ohio
statute3 against a plaintiff or against another defendant who, if sued in-
dividually or separately, would be entitled to be sued in a different county
a similar problem is presented.
The Ohio legislature attempted to resolve the problems presented above
in Ohio Revised Code Section 2703.04 as follows:
When the action is rightly brought in any county according to sections
2703.32 to 2703A0, inclusive, of the Revised Code, a summons may be
issued to any other county against one or more of the defendants at the
plaintiff's request.
I. VALIDITY OF SERVICE DEPENDENT UPON PROPER VENUE
With respect to the general scope of this topic, the ancillary question of
whether the defendant has merely a personal privilege to request that his
claim be tried in the proper county, or an absolute right to demand trial
there is worthy of special consideration. This question is answered when
we determine whether process served on a defendant by a court in the wrong
county confers jurisdiction upon it to render a personal judgment against
him. 4 Assuming that a particular Ohio common pleas court has jurisdiction
1Meyer v. Cincinnati Street Ry., 157 Ohio St. 38, 104 N.E.2d 173 (1952)2 "All actions, other than those mentioned in sections 2307.32 to 2307.38, incusive,
of the Revised Code, must be bought in the county in which a defendant resides or
may be summoned. " OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.39. The Ohio Constitution
provides that the jurisdiction of the common pleas courts is to be determined by
statute. OHIo CONsT. Art. IV Sec. 4. By the exercise of this power, the legislature
may regulate and control the place of trial for civil actions, subject to the limitations
imposed by the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Inter-Ins. Exchange of Chi-
cago Motor Club v. Wagstaff, 144 Ohio St. 457, 59 N.E.2d 373 (1945); Allen v.
Smith, 84 Ohio St. 283, 95 N.E. 829 (1911) "It is well settled that, in the absence
of express constitutional provisions to the contrary, the legislature may regulate, and
control the venue in civil actions, subject alone to the limitation that reasonable op-
portunity must be given for the prosecution and defense thereof." State v. First
State Bank, 52 N.D. 231, 249, 202 N.W 391, 398 (1925).
For an example of the Federal Constitution s "commerce dause" being used as a
method of controlling the place of trial in civil actions, see 17 MINN. L. REV. 392.
3 OHIO REv. CODE § 2309.16.
'State ex rel. Yett v. Peters, 185 Ore., 350, 203 P.2d 299 (1949); Mutzig v. Hope,
176 Ore. 368, 158 P.2d 110 (1945).
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over the subject matter in a particular case,5 the requisites of a personal
judgment may be met either by valid service on the defendant,8 or by his
voluntary appearance.7 A summons is valid if the defendant must come into
court and assert his objection to trial in the wrong county, and if this is the
case, the defendant has a mere privilege to be tied in the proper county."
It follows that such a summons would be valid if an Ohio common pleas
court is a court of statewide jurisdiction for all purposes.9
The Ohio courts have indicated that an Ohio common pleas court is not
a court of statewide jurisdiction for the purpose of summoning a defendant
from another county when the action is brought in the wrong county. Thus,
an Ohio appellate court held on a motion to quash service of summons and
to vacate an in personam default judgment that the court never acquired
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant where the venue was improper
and the defendant never made a voluntary appearance, even though per-
sonal service was made on the defendant in another county. The service on
the defendant was of no more effect than if it had been made on a resident
and citizen of another state.'0 The Ohio Supreme Court has not ruled on the
extent to which the validity of service is dependent on proper venue; it
has, however, indicated that if the place of trial is improper, personal service
on a non-resident defendant will be invalid." The question is open in Ohio
but it is likely that the Ohio Supreme Court will hold that a defendant has an
absolute right to be sued in the proper county.
"'The court of common pleas shall have original jurisdiction in all civil cases where
the sum or matter in dispute exceeds the exclusive original junisdiction of justices
of the peace. " OHio REv. CODE § 2305.01.
6OHio REv. CODE § 2703.08.
7 OHIo REv. CODE § 2703.09.
8Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated S. Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1929); State
ex rel. Yett v. Peters, 185 Ore. 350, 203 P.2d 299 (1949); Mutzig v. Hope, 176
Ore. 368, 158 P.2d 110 (1945).
'See 20 MINN. L. 1,Ev. 617, 622.
"Snyder v. Clough, 71 Ohio App. 440, 50 N.E.2d 384 (1942). Kendall v. United
States, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838) (process cannot reach a party beyond the territorialjurisdiction of the court); Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N.E. 160
(1887).
A motion to set aside a default judgment on the grounds that the court had no
jurisdiction over the defendant, because the place of trial had been determined by
the residence of an alleged joint defendant who had been dismissed from the action
came before the Ohio Supreme Court in Maloney v. Callahan, 127 Ohio St. 387, 188
N.E. 656 (1933). Denying the motion on other grounds the court stated: "If it
were apparent from the records that there was no joint liability on the part of Isaacs,
the resident defendant, and his dismissal was for that reason, we would be required
to hold that the trial court was without jurisdiction to render valid judgment against
Maloney, the non-resident defendant." Another Ohio Supreme Court dictum de-
clares: "Neither a railroad company, nor other corporation, nor even a natural per-
son, is bound to appear in an action in obedience to a summons served out of the
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II. IN PERSONAM ACTIONS
Where a personal judgment is sought against a non-resident of the
county in which an action is brought, an Ohio common pleas court can ac-
quire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant or defendants in another
county within the state. A condition precedent to the proper service of sum-
mons on the non-resident defendant is that the action be "rightly brought"
in that county.' 2 The Ohio courts have consistently held that the correct
interpretation of "rightly brought" is "successfully prosecuted against the
resident defendant" where the place of trial is determined by the residence
of one of the defendants.13 Th effects of this position produce a procedural
maze which offers many pitfalls for the unwary.
Since a defendant will be properly before the court if he voluntarily ap-
pears in the action against him, a non-resident defendant must, if he appears
'in the action, make his objection to the improper place of trial and resulting
improper service of summons at his earliest opportunity." A general ap-
prescribed county." Railroad Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207, 210, 24 N.E. 269
(1890).
" OHIO REV. CODE § 2703.04. Bennett v. Sinclair Refining Co., 144 Ohio St. 139,
57 N.E.2d 776 (1945) (when a tort action is properly commenced in any county a
summons may be issued to any other county against one or more defendants); Inter-
Ins. Exchange of Chicago Motor Club v. Wagstaff, 144 Ohio St. 457, 59 N.E.2d 373
(1945); Gorey v. Black, 100 Ohio St. 73, 125 N.E. 126 (1919) (a voluntary ap-
pearance by one of the defendants who are subsequently joined is sufficient to estab-
lish the venue in the county of suit); Thomson v. Massie, 41 Ohio St. 307 (1884)
(even though at the time of the commencement of the action no judgment could be
rendered by reason of pending bankruptcy against the defendant whose residence
established the venue, properly joined defendants may be served in another county).
" Glass v. Tolley Transfer Co., 112 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio App. 1952); Stark
County Agricultural Socy v. Brenner, 122 Ohio St. 560, 172 N.E.2d 659 (1930);
Bucurenciu v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927); Allen v. Miller, 11
Ohio St. 374 (1860); Dunn v. Hazlett, 4 Ohio St. 435 (1854). C!. Adams v. Tre-
panier Lumber Co., 117 Ohio St. 298, 302, 158 N.E. 541, 542 (1927); Drea v. Car-
rington, 32 Ohio St. 595, 602 (1877); Hoffman v. Johnson, 86 Ohio App. 19, 28, 36
N.E.2d 184, 189 (1941); State ex rel. McGann v. Evatt, Tax Comm'r, 63 Ohio App.
564, 567, 27 N.E.2d 490, 491 (1940); Uthoff v. DuBrie, 62 Ohio App. 285, 287,
23 N.E.2d 854, 855 (1939) But see Maloney v. Callahan, 127 Ohio St. 387, 393,
188 N.E. 656, 658 (1933) (dismissal of one defendant held not to require the trial
court to dismiss the action as against alleged joint defendant who was a non-resident
of the county of suit where the place of trial had been determined by the residence of
the alleged joint defendant who had been dismissed). See also 12 NEB. L. BULL.
341 (1933-34) (the identical rule seems to prevail sn Nebraska).
4 Foster v. Borne, 63 Ohio St. 169, 58 N.E. 66 (1900); Long v. Newhouse, 57 Ohio
St. 348, 49 N.E. 79 (1897); Mason v. Alexander, 44 Ohio St. 318, 7 N.E. 435
(1886); Handy v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 366 (1881); Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90
Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951); accord, Berger v. Nobel, 81 Ga. App. 759,
59 S.E.2d 761 (1950); Davis v. Waycross Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 390,
3 S.E.2d 863 (1939); King v. Ingels, 121 Kan. 790, 250 Pac. 306 (1926); Cf.,
Evans v. Garrett, 72 Ga. App. 846, 35 S.E.2d 387 (1945) (non-resident defendants
demurred to the petition but in the demurrer expressly reversed their right to insist
on a plea to the jurisdiction over their persons, and it was held that they had not vol-
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pearance before this objection at his earliest opportunity will preclude the
non-resident defendant from urging it at a later time. 5
If the petition shows on its face that the action is brought in the wrong
county, the defendant must make his objection in the form of a motion to
quash service.' Where the place of trial has been determined by the resi-
dence of one of the defendants, the petition may show that the defendants
are improperly joined in the action, and thus the court should sustain such
a motion.'7 If the court sustains the defendant's motion to quash, it is held
to be a final order, and the plaintiff may appeal directly from this decision.,'
Some Ohio decisions do hold that the sustaining of a motion to quash is not
a final order.' These cases, however, are limited to situations where the
ruling on the motion does not dispose of the proceeding. 0 The right of the
plaintiff to appeal from the order of a lower court sustaining a motion to
quash by the defendant has not been questioned in Ohio where the ground
for the motion is that the action has been brought in the wrong county.2'
The Ohio courts have been very liberal in allowing the defendant to include
matters seemingly going to the merits of the plaintiff's claim in his motion to
quash on this ground.22 Even a general denial to an amended petition has
untarily submitted their persons to the jurisdiction of the court). Contra, Baltimore
& 0. Ry. v. Hollenberger, 76 Ohio St. 177, 81 N.E. 184 (1907).
'See note 14 supra.
"
0Although there do not seem to be any direct holdings that a motion to quash is the
proper method of objecting to improper venue, many Ohio cases inferentially sustain
such a right Loftus v. Pennsylvania Ry., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N.E. 94 (1923),
error dird 266 U.S. 639, 45 Sup. Ct. 97 (1925).
" Canton Provisions Co. v. Gaudner, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935); Smith
v. Johnson, 57 Ohio St. 486, 49 N.E. 693 (1898); Mercer v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 50
Ohio LAbs. 219, 79 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio App. 1947); Hoffman v. Johnston, 68 Ohio
App. 19, 36 N.E.2d 184 (1941); State ex. rel. McGann v. Evatt, Tax omm'r, 63
Ohio App. 564, 27 N.E.2d 490 (1940); Trotter v. Trotter, 55 Ohio App. 198, 9
N.E.2d 297 (1936); accord Jackson v. Norton, 75 Ga. App. 650, 44 S.E.2d 269
(1948); Schoonover v. Clark, 155 Kan. 835, 130 P.2d 619 (1942); cf. Drea v.
Carrington, 32 Ohio St. 595, 602 (1877).
' See note 21 snfra.
See note 20 sinra.
'State ex rel. McCale v. Industrial Comm'r, 132 Ohio St. 13, 4 N.E.2d 263 (1936);
Schenck v. Union Service Co., 60 Ohio L. Abs. 201, 101 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio App.
1949) (quashing of service of summons because of irregularity of process as dis-
tingushed from attacking the jurisdiction of the court is not a final order); Doan v.
Stout, 67 Ohio App. 359, 36 N.E.2d 827 (1941).
" Gorey v. Black, 100 Ohio St. 73, 125 N.E. 126 (1919); Allen v. Smith, 84 Ohio
St. 283, 95 N.E. 829 (1911); Drea v. Carrington, 32 Ohio St. 595 (1877); Uthoff
v. Dubne, 62 Ohio App. 285, 23 N.E.2d 854 (1939); cf. Urschel v. Hannin, 25
Ohio App. 368, 371, 158 N.E. 550, 552 (1928) (dictum).
'Drea v. Carrington, 32 Ohio St. 595 (1877) (motion to quash supported by an
answer alleging that these defendants were only secondarily liable and were there-
fore not properly before the court). Contra, King v. Ingels, 121 Kan. 790, 250 Pac.
306 (1926) (defendants filed a motion to quash and stated that the petition failed
1954)
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
been treated as a motion to quash when the plaintiff was allowed to amend
so as to proceed against the non-resident defendant alone where the place
of trial had been determined by the residence of a dismissed defendant.
23
The overruling of a motion to quash is not a final order and thus not ap-
pealable in Ohlo.24 An erroneous xaling on the non-resident defendant's
motion to quash will not prejudice the non-resident defendant's position, for
if he has made his objection at his earliest opportunity and properly pre-
served it throughout the proceeding he will be able to urge it again on
appeal.25
Where the place of trial is determined by the residence of one of the
defendants, a general denial may properly be used to put in issue the fact
of improper service of process where the evidence in the case establishes the
non-liability of the resident defendant, so that if judgment is rendered
against the non-resident defendant alone, he may at that time make his ob-
jection to the improper service of process on the ground that the action
was brought in the wrong county.20 If, however, a judgment favorable
to the non-resident defendant is rendered, it is not an erroneous judgment,
and the defendant may rely on it if he is later sued on the same cause of
action .2  This follows logically from an early ruling of the Ohio Supreme
Court that the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on the issues raised in his
petition and in a motion to quash supported by an answer denying the alle-
gations of the peition which tended to establish the proper service of sum-
mons on the non-resident defendants.28 If the plaintiff has a right to have
these issues tried by a jury, then the only way in which a defendant can be
protected in his right to be sued in the proper county is to allow him to assert
his objection when the improper venue becomes apparent.
The plaintiff, always has the right to submit the issues to the jury so that
if the facts essential to the proper venue in that county, and thus essential to
the proper service of summons on the non-resident defendant, are found
adverse to the plaintiff, the jury should go no further but should render its
verdict on that issue alone.20 Such a decision would not be res judicata on
the issue of the non-resident's liability on the merits.30 In reality, it seems
to state a cause of action against the resident defendants; the court held that by this
act they had generally appeared)
'Dunn v. Hazlett, 4 Ohio St. 435 (1854).
2 OHIO JuR. 2d 610.
' Fostoria v. Fox, 60 Ohio St. 340, 54 N.E. 370 (1899).
="Glass v. Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 112 N.E.2d 823 (1953); Bucurenciu v.
Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927); Dunn v. Hazlett, 4 Ohio St. 435
(1854).
' Fostoria v. Fox, 60 Ohio St. 340, 54 N.E. 370 (1899).
'Drea v. Carrington, 32 Ohio St. 595 (1877).
'Bucurenciu v. Rarnba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 552, 159 N.E. 565, 567 (1927).
30 See 23 OHIO JuR. 1003.
[Fall
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the courts are indulging in a fiction to preserve the right of a defendant to
be sued in the proper county. For, in contemplation of the settled rules of
law, a judgment rendered where -there is neither service of process, nor a
voluntary general appearance is void, and cannot be enforced by the plain-
tiff,"' or pleaded as res judicata by a defendant.3 2 Therefore, since a special
appearance in these cases is impossible until the non-liability of the resident
defendant has been established by the judgment of the court, the Ohio
courts have allowed a special appearance at this stage, even though the
non-resident defendant previously had merely inferentially contested the
place of trial. 3
In Ohio, even though the non-resident defendant has filed a motion for
a new trial after the rendition of a judgment for the resident defendant
and before he has specifically raised the issue of improper venue by an
objection to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may still pre-
vail on this issue.3 4 The result seems questionable because a motion for a
new trial does invoke a ruling of the court on the merits of the case, and
constitutes a general appearance which should preclude the non-resident
defendant from thereafter resisting the exercise of jurisdiction over his per-
son.2 5
The effect of the dismissal of the defendant upon whose residence the
place of trial has been determined concerning the position thereafter of the
non-resident defendant in the action is not entirely clear in Ohio. In
Stark County Agricultural Socy v. Brenner,6 the court concluded:
It is unimportant to determine whether or not there was a joint enter-
prise, and therefore a joint liability between the veterans [the resident
defendant] and De Michele [the non-resident defendant], because the
veterans were voluntarily dismissed from the case, with prejudice, and are
therefore definitely discharged from liability for the injury. 37
The Veterans of Foreign Wars having been volunarily dismissed from
the case, and it having been found by this court that there is no liability
on the part of the Agricultural Society, it follows that there can be no such
joint liability as would justify the maintenance of an action against De
Michele in this county other than that of his residence. '
'Hayes v. Kentucky Joint Stock Land Bank of Lexington, 125 Ohio St. 359, 181
N.E. 542 (1932).
2Oil Well Supply Co. v. Koen, 64 Ohio St. 422, 60 N.E. 603 (1901).
' The Ohio courts have taken the position that when the non-resident defendant
answers with a general denial, he puts in issue the fact of whether service was prop-
erly made on him. Glass v. Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 112 N.E.2d 823 (1953);
Bucurenciu v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927); Dunn v. Hazlett, 4
Ohio St. 435 (1854).
' Bucurencau v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927).
't In Berger v. Nobel, 81 Ga. App. 759, 59 S.E.2d 761 (1950) it was held that by a
motion for a new trial defendant admits the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
" 122 Ohio St. 560, 172 N.E. 659 (1930).
'lid. at 566, 172 N.E. at 661.
Is Id. at 573, 172 N.E. at 663.
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Three years later the Ohio Supreme Court, without citing the Stark case,
upheld a default judgment against a non-resident defendant, stating:
However the bare fact that Isaacs [the resident defendant] was dis-
missed from the action does not of itself justify us in saying that the trial
court thereby lost jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant; the records
failing to show that Isaacs could not have been legally included in the
judgments. In other words the fact of his dismissal standing alone does not
establish his non-liability. 30
Thus, the court in the Stark case takes the position that either the dis-
missal of the defendant upon whose residence the place of trial has been
determined will always result in the dismissal of the non-resident defendant
upon proper motion, or that an affirmative showing of the liability of this
resident defendant is a requisite for dismissal of the non-resident defendant.
Whereas, the court in the Maloney case asserts unequivocally that the
record must affirmatively show the non-liability of the resident defendant
before the impropriety of the place of trial as to the non-resident defendant
will be established.
Authority from other states on the effect of the dismissal of the de-
fendant upon whose residence the place of trial has been determined on
the position thereafter of the non-resident defendant is conflicting.'0 In
Ohio, the requirement of an affirmative showing of liability would be
more consistent with the policy of the decisions requiring successful prose-
cution of the proceeding against the resident defendant.' 1
If the non-liability of the resident defendant is established for the first
time on appeal, Ohio takes the position that this is enough to preclude con-
sideration of the question of the liability of the non-resident defendant in
that proceeding.42 The only conclusion consistent with the Ohio position
"Maloney v. Callahan, 127 Ohio St. 387, 393, 188 N.E. 656, 658 (1933).
'In the following cases the dismissal of the resident defendant resulted in dismissal
of the non-resident defendant upon proper motion. Volok v. McCarter Truck Line,
156 Kan. 128, 131 P.2d 713 (1942); Meyers v. Kansas, 0. & G. Ry., 200 Okla. 676,
199 P.2d 600 (1948); Delaney v. Atterbury, 189 Okla. 361, 116 P.2d 968 (1941);
Pine v. Superior Court of Seminole Cty., Okla., 39 P.2d 530 (1934). In the fol-
lowing cases the dismissal of the resident defendant did not result in dismissal of
the non-resident defendant even though he properly objected to the place of trial.
Pike County Coal Co. v. Farrabee, 79 Ind. App. 210, 137 N.E. 680 (1923); Hender-
son v. Nat. Mut. Cas. Co., 168 Kan. 674, 215 P.2d 225 (1950).
'The policy of these decisions in Ohio is expressed in Allen v. Miller, 11 Ohio St.
374, 379 (1860) as follows: "'It seems to us that the words 'defendant' and 'defen-
dants' as employed in those sections of the code to which reference has been made,
in so far as they effect the question of jurisdiction, must be held to mean not nominal
defendants merely, but parties who have a real and substantial interest adverse to the
plaintiff, and against whom substantial relief is sought; and that to hold otherwise,
would open wide a door to all sorts of colorable devices, to defeat the policy of the
law in respect to jurisdiction - devices difficult to detect, but oppressive and wrong-
ful in their practical operation."
'Stark County Agricultural Socy v. Brenner, 122 Ohio St. 560, 172 N.E. 659
NOTES
requiring successful prosecution against the defendant upon whose residence
the place of trial has been determined before a personal judgment can be
rendered against the non-resident defendant, would be a dismissal of the
action against the non-resident defendant because he objected when his
first opportunity presented itself on appeal.
The opportunity to take advantage of a finding of non-liability of the
defendant upon whose residence the place of trial has been determined by
a proper objection may be lost by the non-resident defendant before the
chance presents itself. Motions in the nature of demurrers to the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter,43 or motions requiring the plaintiff
separately to state and number his causes of action, and to strike certain
matter from the petton,44 or joint answers which purport to limit the ap-
pearance to questions of jurisdiction, but which also contest the validity of
the joinder," have all been held by Ohio courts to preclude an objection to
the improper place of trial by the non-resident defendant based on the
non-liability of the resident defendant. But, even an answer denying the
merits of the plaintiff's claim, which also asserts the fact of the non-
residence of the defendant will not preclude that defendant's later motion
for dismissal on the basis of the improper place of trial when it appears that
the resident defendant is a mere nominal defendant. 6
An appeal on questions of law and fact, as distinguished from an ap-
peal on questions of law,4 7 will also defeat the right of the non-resident
defendant to rely on the finding of non-liability of the resident defendant.
This is a result of the nature of an appeal on questions of law and fact in
Ohio. The appellate court considers the entire record de imvo, and as such,
the taking of the appeal on questions of law and fact or causing notice of
such an appeal to be entered on the record is a general appearance.49 On the
other hand, an appeal on questions of law to a higher court, objecting to a
judgment of the lower court on the issue of jurisdiction of the person is not
a general appearance because an appeal on questions of law is a new pro-
ceeding.50
(1930); Smith v. Johnson, 57 Ohio St. 486, 49 N.E. 693 (1898); accord, Adams
v. Trepanier Lumber Co., 117 Ohio St. 298, 158 N.E. 541 (1927); Fostoria v. Fox,
60 Ohio St. 340, 54 N.E. 370 (1899).
'Handy v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 366 (1881).
"Long v. Newhouse, 57 Ohuo St. 348, 49 N.E. 79 (1897).
"SDavis v. Moraine Center, Inc., 8 Ohio L. Abs. 575 (Ohuo App. 1930).
'Allen v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374 (1860).T OHIO R V. CODE S 2505.01.
'Foster v. Borne, 63 Ohio St. 169, 58 N.E. 66 (1900); Mason v. Alexander, 44
Ohio St. 318, 7 N.E. 435 (1886); Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107
N.E.2d 409 (1951).
See note 48 supra.
' See note 48 supra.
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III. COUNTERCLAIMS
Ohio Revised Code Section 2309.16 provides for counterclaims by one
or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs or one or more defendants
in certain instances. Depending on the circumstances of the particular
case, a new party either "may"51 or "shall"5 2 be made by summons to
answer the counterclaim. Two Ohio appellate courts have reached con-
trary results on the question whether summons may issue on counterclaims
against a new party and a personal judgment rendered if that new party is
a resident of another county and properly objects to the place of trial. One
appellate court upheld the validity of a summons issued to another county
upon a counterclaim5 while the other held that this was not the bringing
of an action within the terms of Ohio's non-resident service statute54 so as
to authorize the service of summons on an additional party in another
county.5 -
The Ohio Supreme Court has not as yet ruled on the propriety of the
issuance of a summons to another county on a counterclaim. However, in
,Gorey v. Black," the Ohio Supreme Court held that even though the statute
providing for the place of trial for actions arising out of automobile col-
lisions did not specifically provide for service of summons on non-residents
of the county in which suit was brought, the general non-resident service
statute57 was sufficient authority for the service of summons on a non-resi-
dent of the county of the forum since the action was "rightly brought" in
that county.
Authority in other states seems to support the validity of a summons is-
sued to another county within the state on a counterclaim where the counter-
claim provisions are similar to those of Ohio and no constitutional limita-
tions intervene.5 8
"OHIO REV. CODE § 2309.17.
52 OHIO REv. CODE 5 2309.18.
Aldrich v. Friedman, 18 Ohio App. 302 (1923).
" OHIO REv. CODE § 2703.04.
" Borling v. Huber, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 273 (Ohio App. 1939).
" 100 Ohio St. 73, 125 N.E. 126 (1919).
"See note 54 supra.
U For the right of a tortfeasor in a jurisdiction which has adopted the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act to seek contribution against a joint tortfeasor in
an action pending in a county which would not be the proper venue of an indepen-
dent action against such tortfeasor, see Lacewell v. Griffin, 214 Ark. 909, 219 S.W.2d
227 (1949). This case holds that an action between the tortfeasors is a third party
action growing out of the first action, which had been properly brought in that
county; and the third party action necessarily continued in the same venue as that of
the original action. Hence, by analogy, a counterclaim should be considered to be a
third party action growing out of the first action, thus justifying issuance of sum-
mons against a new party beyond the territorial limits of the county of the forum.
NOTES
IV THE GOOD FAITH RULE
In Ohio, the good faith of the plaintiff in joining several defendants in
one action is another factor in the plaintiff's favor on the issue whether the
action was "rightly brought" in that county so as to authorize the issuance
of summons to another county against a non-resident defendant when the
evidence in the proceeding establishes the non-liability of the defendant
whose residence determined the place of trial.5 9 However, several juris-
dictions have interpreted "rightly brought" to mean "brought in good
faith against the resident defendant" where the place of trial is determined
by the residence of one of the defendants.6 0 The result of this position is
that even though the evidence does establish the non-liability of the de-
fendant upon whose residence the place of trial was determined, the place
of trial as to the non-resident defendant in that action will not be maproper
if the plaintiff joined the several defendants and chose the place of trial in.
good faith.
Some of the cases purporting to follow this "good faith rule' are of
questionable authority. In several the court would have been justified in
holding that the non-resident defendant appeared generally, thus obviating
the necessity for consideration of the issue of improper venue.61 In one,6 2
the plaintiff dismissed her action against the resident defendant, apparently
because of a settlement and proceeded against the non-resident defendant.
The opinion, although apparently basing its conclusion on the issue of good
faith commencement is also consistent with the result found in cases requir-
ing some affirmative showing of non-liability on the part of the resident
defendant before the dismissal will enable the non-resident defendant to
' Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (1951).
'Pike County Coal Co. v. Farrabee, 79 Ind. App. 210, 137 NE. 680 (1923); Hen-
derson v. Nat. Mut. Cas. Co., 168 Kan. 674, 215 P.2d 225 (1950); Volock v. Mc-
Carter Truck Line, 156 Kan. 128, 131 P.2d 713 (1942); Schoonover v. Clark, 155
Kan. 835, 130 P.2d 619 (1942); Verdigris River and Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. City
of Coffeyville, 149 Kan. 191, 86 P.2d 592 (1939); King v. Ingels, 121 Kan. 790,
250 Pac. 306 (1926); Van Buren v. Pratt, 123 Kan. 581, 256 Pac. 1006 (1923);
Farmers Grain & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 120 Kan. 21, 245 Pac.
734 (1926); Hawkins v. Brown, 78 Kan. 284, 97 Pac. 479 (1908); Cf. Moore v.
Gore, 191 Tenn. 14, 21, 231 S.W.2d 361, 364 (1950); Achy v. Holland, 76 Tenn.
510, 512 (1881).
Farmers Grain & Supply Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 120 Kan. 21, 245 Pac
734 (1926) (an answer pleading to the merits of the action before its motion to the
improper place of trial was filed); Van Buren v. Pratt, 123 Kan. 581, 256 Pac. 1006
(1923) (the non-resident defendant filed a demurrer on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter before the motion to quash was acted upon
by the court); Hawkins v. Brown, 78 Kan. 284, 97 Pac. 479 (1908) (included a
motion in the nature of a demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter in a motion to quash on the basis of improper venue).
'Pike County Coal Co. v. Farrabee, 79 Ind. App. 210, 137 N.E. 680 (1923).
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